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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
May Term 1940
ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, J. W. FUNK, HERBERT C. TAYLOR and HENRY
JORGENSEN AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants,

No. 6245

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
This proceeding calls into question the powers of
the Liquor Control Commission and is of state-wide importance. The rights of the plaintiff are admittedly
substantial and the damage it has and will suffer is substantial and incalculable.

It is prayed that this Court, consistent with its previous practice in s~milar cases, assume jurisdiction of
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2
the matter and determine and declare the rights of the
p~rties hereto.
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has power
to issue the writ of prohibition which is requested by
this proceeding. Section 20-2-2 R. S. U. 1933 provides:
''The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus."
Part 1. THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS CAUSE:
Pursuant to a request of this Court we will address
ourselves to the question whether the Court should exercise its discretion for or against assumption of jurisdiction or remit the plaintiff to its remedy in the first
instance to one or more district courts.
This Court has many times assumed jurisdiction
in similar cases in order to afford interested parties
that plain, adequate and speedy remedy which the law
contemplates. This case is one in which plaintiff's damage accumulates constantly by the passage of time and
for which there can be no recovery. It is urged, therefore, that to remit plaintiff to its remedy before the
district courts will deprive it of the type of relief to
which it is fairly entitled.
It is significant that most if not all of the cases involving a writ of prohibition in the State of Utah deal
with original applications for the writ in this court.
Applications for the writ have been and will no doubt
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be relatively infrequent although much of the legislation
creating administrative boards with quasi jurisdictional
powers provides for a writ of review from this Court.
Such is the case, for example, in the Workmen's Compensation Act and in the laws relating to the Public
Service Commission. Procedure for remedy and review
is also contained in the Unemployment Compensation
Act. There is, however, no appeal provided by law from
the decisions of the State Liquor Commission. The Commission is a part of the executive function of the State,
and neither the Commission, nor its members, in the
absence of fraud, would be liable for damages inflicted
by the enforcement of an order even though the order
be invalid and in excess of jurisdiction. We recognize
the rule that this court has the right and the power to
determine its own jurisdiction and would not be required in the exercise of a sound discretion to take jurisdiction of all applications for writs of prohibition if, in
the opnion of the Court, a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy would be afforded by ·requiring the applicant
for the writ to pursue his remedy in the District Court.
But it appears obvious from an examination of the facts
and circumstances at bar that an application for a writ
of prohibition or injunction in the district court would
not afford the applicant speedy and adequate relief.
It clarifies the question under present discussion to

divorce it from the merits of the case for the moment
and assume that the plaintiff is being deprived arbitrar-
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ily and capriciously and under a void order of ih; righ1
to transport and sell beer in Utah in eight ounce bot
tles.
This is a valuable property right, the destructior
of which can only be averted by actiou of this Court
When and if the order is finally held to be in excess oj
the jurisdiction of the Commission the applicant wil:
have no remedy under which to recover the damage~
which it will have sustained. Therefore, the remedy tc
be adequate must be speedy. The situation presentee
requires a final determination of the validity of the order at the earliest possible date. It would be unfair anc
unjust to require the plaintiff to proceed by an application for an injunction in the district court. If a preliminary restraining order were issued such would requin
of the applicant the putting up a bond even if the district court should decide that it could restrain the en
forcement of the order pendente lite, with the conse
quent hazard of suits on such a bond by parties whc
might claim to have been damaged by the non-compli
ance with the order.
Brewers in Utah who are distributing beer in bot
tles of the capacity permitted under the order of th~
Commission would probably claim damages by reasm
of the sale of beer in eight ounce bottles if it should h
finally deter,mined that the order of the Commissi01
were valid. This would result in a multiplicity of suit
for damage and would be a hazard which no litigan
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should be forced to assume where another speedy and
adequate remedy is available. The proceeding in a district court would involve the delay of an appeal to the
Supreme Court before the question could be finally determined. Apparently there is nothing in the law which
would prevent the bringing of suits for the determination of the validity of the order in different district
courts of the State at the same time, whose opinions
might conflict, thereby making confusion more confused
until the final determination by this court.
A district court might well be reluctant to condemn
a regulation of the Commission in the absence- of some
controlling or guiding announcement from this Court,
in which event it would pass the responsibility up to this
Court. This plaintiff and all others similarly interested
would then find themselves, after the long delay of in-termediate litigation, exactly where they are at the moment. If it should then be ruled that the order complained of is invalid the losses suffered by plaintiff, for
which it has no recourse, would be to the extent of the
delay irretrievably increased.
The law gives to the district courts no special supervisory power over the Commission. Assumption by
this Court of jurisdiction in this matter would be consistent and in harmony with the procedure now well established by which this Court reviews the acts and orders of practically all other administrative bodies.
In Utah Association of Credit -Men v. Bowman
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Judge, et al., 38 Utah 326, 113 Pac. 63, this Court took
original jurisdiction of an application for writ of mandamus against J. M. Bowman, Judge of the civil division
of the city court of Salt Lake City, and against B. S.
Rives, ex-officio clerk of such court, to compel entry of
a default judgment by the clerk. The judge of the city
court had ordered the clerk to refuse to enter a default
judgment on the ground that the statute providing for
such default judgment was unconstitutional. This court
held th~t the clerk was performing a ministerial act in
entering a default judgment and that mandamus was the
proper remedy and granted the writ.
''The Clerk, therefore, wrongfully refused to
perform a legal duty and the Judge wrongfully or
illegally refused to require the Clerk to perform
such duty. In view, therefore, that the Judge has
refused to compel the Clerk to act we must now do
what the Judge ought to have done. It is therefore ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate
issue against the Clerk requiring him to enter judgment as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint filed
in the action to which reference has been made in
this opinion." (Page 339 of 38 Utah).
In that case the district court had concurrent jurisdiction with this Court to issue the writ of mandamus.
However, this court recognized that the question involved was one of public concern and interest which
required speedy and final determination in order to afford the applicant an adequate remedy and in order to
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establish a speedy clarification of the duties of the clerk
of the city court.

An interesting question and decision in point is reported in State ex rel. Patterson v. Lee, 164 So. 188
(Florida 1935). Florida had passed an act to license
certain types of coin operative devices and providing for
the division and distribution of the revenue derived
therefrom. The act was administered by the defendant
Lee as comptroller of the State of Florida. Prior to the
filing of the application for writ of mandamus in the
Supreme Court of Florida the circuit court in and for
Dade County issued its injunction and restraining order
restraining the defendant Lee from enforcing and administering any of the powers, duties or privileges under the act in question. The injunction in the circuit
court was apparently based on the contention that the
operation of a slot machine constituted a lottery. The
defendant in the mandamus proceeding in the Supreme
Court of Florida filed his answer setting up the injunction of the circuit court of Dade County as justification
for a failure to enforce the act. The Supreme Court of
~-,lorida held that the circuit court for Dade County did
not have jurisdiction of the defendant comptroller because his duties were to be performed at the capitol of
the state located in Leon County. The following quotation from the case illustrates the point that the confusion which would result if the applicant in the case at
bar were required to seek an injunction in the district
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courts of the State of Utah against the enforcement of
an order of the Liquor Control Commission is a real and
practical difficulty preventing such remedy from being
adequate:
"That suits instituted in the circuit courts to
control or coerce the comptroller in the exercise of
his administrative duties which are to be performed
at the capitol of the state must be limited to the circuit court in and for Leon County in the second judicial circuit of Florida is necessary; otherwise numerous suits could be instituted throughout the state
of Florida in different circuits involving the same
questions and different results and judgments conflicting in operation could be had against him at one
and the same time in the several different judicial
circuits of the state. This would bring about the
possibilitiy of such confusion as to make it impossible for the comptroller to obey the mandate of
one circuit court without violating that of another
and would place him in position where it would be
impractical to perform his official duties without
appearing to be in contempt of the orders of one
or more circuit courts.
''For the reasons stated, the peremptory writ
will be awarded.''
In the State of Washington, as in Utah, the law provides that both the Supreme Court and the Superior
Courts have jurisdiction to grant writs of mandamuR
and prohibition. In People ex rei. Harris v. Hinckle,
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Secretary of State,

~:27

Pac. 861, the Supreme Court took
original jurisdiction and issued its writ of mandate to
prevent the Secretary of State from permitting the withdrawal of signatures on initiative petitions which had
been filed and was known as the so-called ' 'School Bill.''
The court said:
"We have never refused jurisdiction in a case
where a judicial officer or tribunal was attempting
to exercise unlawful judicial acts, and it makes no
difference what sort of officer or tribunal is attempting to exercise such power." * * * *
''We are therefore of the opinion that under
the constitutional provisions conferring original
jurisdiction upon this court to issue such writ, or
at common law, the writ of prohibition would lie
against this state officer to prevent such usurpation
of power and unlawful exercise of a quasi judicial
function. ' '
In Barnes v. Lehi City et al., 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac.
878, this court took original jurisdiction of an application for prohibition against Lehi City, its mayor and
councilmen, to prevent them from entering into a conditional sales contract with Fairbanks, Morse & Co. for
the purchase and installation of a certain electrical generating unit with its accessories. The writ was denied
on the merits. The court discusses the question whether
the writ provided by our constitution and statutes 1s
the writ known to the common law:
''The true office and function of which is to
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prevent an inferior tribunal, board or individual
from exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions
without quasi jurisdiction or whether it has been
enlarged by our statutes to authorize the probitition of executive or ministerial acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction.''
The court reviews Utah statutes and cases and holds
that the writ provided by our statute authorizes the prohibition of acts in excess of power or jurisdiction whether
judicial or ministerial. It was contended that the Supreme Court should not grant the application for the
writ of prohibition because plaintiffs had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy by injunction. Upon this
question the court said:
"As a general rule prohibition will not lie
where the applicant has any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
When there is another remedy the writ is not demandable as a matter of right. The writ rimy, however, be issued in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion. The law on the subject, as now understood, was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Re Rice, Petitioner, 155 U. S. at page
402, 15 S. Ct. 152, 39 L. Ed. 198, as follows:
"'Where it appears that the court whose action is sought to be prohibited has clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, or of some collateral
matter arising therein, a party who has objected
to the jurisdiction at the outset, and has no other
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remedy, is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a
matter of right. But where there is another legal
remedy by appeal or otherwise, or where the question of the jurisdiction of the court is doubtful, or
depends on facts which are not made matter of record, or where the application is made by a stranger,
the granting or refusal of the writ is discretionary."
The rule there announced was approved by this
court in Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 40

A. L. R. 230.
''We recognize the importance of placing reasonable restrictions upon the use of the writ of pro·
hibition, and have no desire to encourage the practice of invoking the original jurisdiction of this
court by resorting to these extraordinary remedies.
This court has, however, in a great many of the
cases cited by plaintiffs, entertained applications
for writs in situations similar to the situation here
involved. We think that the facts and circumstances of this case justify us in entertaining plaintiff's application for the writ."
The case of Atwood v. Cox, 55 Pac. (2d) 377, 92
Utah 149, decided by this court in 1936, contains an exhaustive and penetrating analysis of the difficult question of when the action of an inferior tribunal is in excess of its jurisdiction so as to justify a writ of prohibition and when such action is merely erroneous leaving
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the aggrieved party to his remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal.
"In certain situations where it would work a
palpable injustice or hardship or because damage
which could not be checked or remedied in any
other way, the Superior Court will not go too refinedly into the question as to what constitutes error merely or lack or excess of jurisdiction before
issuing the writ. * * *
''In a number of jurisdictions where a threatened interlocutory or intermediate order involving
some affirmative action of the lower court in reference to property, status, relationship, or rights
of parties in respect to property was of such a nature as to destroy the status quo and render an appeal or other remedy ineffectual to undo the mischief, the courts have issued the writ of prohibition
as a 'fill-in' in order to prevent threatened mischief;
most times not giving reasons therefore except to
say categorically that the court below was threatening to exceed its jurisdiction or judicial powers or
proceeding unlawfully or without legal warrant."
Certainly any remedy which the applicant herein might have pursued in the district court to be effective would have destroyed the status quo with reference to the order of the Liquor Commission and an appeal would have been ineffectual to undo the mischief
or to prevent threatened mischief.
It is significant to observe that this court in the
1
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cases to be shortly discussed has taken jurisdiction of
applications for writs of prohibition and has decided
the question involved on the merits where the defendants were public tribunals or political sub-divisions of
the State of Utah without discussing or considering the
propriety of exercising such jurisdiction. The situations
presented to the court in these cases, which are similar
to the question involved in the case at bar, obviously
called for the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this
court to afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The fact that ,the same relief could have been requested
from the district courts was apparently not considered
by any of the attorneys in these cases or by the couru
itself as creating any question worthy of discussion
upon the propriety of this court assuming and exercising its concurrent original jurisdiction.

Moyle vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, et al, 53 Utah 352, 174 Pac. 198 was an application filed in the Supreme Court for writ of prohibition
against the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County and the individual members thereof to prohibit
them from holding a special election which had been
called for the purpose of submitting to the qualified voters of said county the proposition whether certain bonds
should be issued and the proceeds thereof devoted to the
construction of certain specified public roads in said
county. An alternative writ was issued and the defendants appeared and filed what was in legal effect a gen-
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eral demurrer. The court considered the application on
its merits and denied the writ.

Hartley vs. State Road Commission, et al, 53 Utah,
589, 174 Pac. 639 was an original proceeding in prohibition against the State Road Commission and Simon Bamberger and others as members thereof. The attorney
general filed a general demurrer, and the court held on
the merits that the defendants had not exceeded their authority when they authorized the use of $50,000.00 derived from certain bonds to be used on roads in Davis
County. The court assumes, without discussion, the
propriety of its exercise of original jurisdiction upon the
application for prohibition.

Booth vs. Midvale City, 55 Utah 220, 184 Pac. 799,
was an application to the Supreme Court for a writ of
prohibition against Midvale City and another to restrain
the city from entering into a contract with the county for
paving certain streets within the limits of the city. The
application is considered on its merits and denied without the point being raised or discussed that there was
any question about the propriety of the Supreme Court
exercising its original jurisdiction.

Van Orton vs. Board of Education of Cache County
School District, 56 Utah 430, 191 Pac. 230, was an original application for a writ of prohibition against the
Board of Education of Cache County School District and
others to prohibit them from issuing and selling bonds
voted at a special bond election held in said District Feb-
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ruary 17, 1920. The case was considered on its merits
and the application for writ of prohibition was denied.
Cottrell vs. Millard County Drainage District, 58
Utah 375, 199 Pac. 166, was an original proceeding in the
Supreme Court against the Millard County Drainage District and others seeking to prohibit the defendants from
offering for sale or selling certain bonds of the District
in the sum of $150,000.00. The case was considered on
its merits and the petition dismissed.
Livingston vs. Millard County Drainage District No.
3, 58 Utah 382, 199 Pac. 661, was an original application
for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the defendants from
delivering certain drainage district bonds and from complying with the terms of a certain agreement entered into between the district and a contractor. The application was considered on its merits and the peremptory
writ of prohibition issued.
In McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 P. (2d) 608, this court assumed original jurisdiction
to test the validity of Mandatory Order No. 1 of the Industrial Commission fixing minimum wages and hours
and condition of employment for women and minors in
the retail trade. There, as here, it might have been asserted that inasmuch as the district courts had concurrent jurisdiction with this court the parties should be
remitted to the inferior court in the first instance. But
the power of an administrative body exercising statewide authority was involved and this court, recognizing
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the necessity of quickly determining and declaring the
extent and limitations upon such power, assumed jurisdiction and settled the matter without the necessity for
the delay which would have attended intermediate litigation in the district courts.
Likewise State ex rei. Public Service Co·mmission
v. Southern Pacifi cCompany, et al., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.
( 2d) 25, this court exercised its original jurisdiction to
consider an application of the State for a writ of mandamus to require the defendants and others to file statements with the Public Service Commission in accordance
with the dictates of certain acts of th~ legislature commonly known as the Maw Bills. The powers and jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission were brought
in issue and this court did not hesitate to take jurisdiction and determine without delay the rights of the
parties.
So in Paramor Theatre Company v. Fair Trades~
Commission of the State of Utah, 95 Utah 354, 81 P. (2d)
639, this court, appreciating the desirability of quickly
construing, determing and declaring the rights of the
Commission involved and the public affected, took jurisdiction and settled the question presented.
In Tite v. Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P. (2d)
734, the Tax Commission had assessed a fine against a
merchant of Ogden for violation of certain statutory provisions requiring the affixing of revenue stamps to
packages containing cigarettes. The merchant, feeling
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aggrieved nd challenging the power of the Tax Commission to assess a fine in such cases and being unwilling
to run the risk of delay in haYing his rights in the matter settled and determined, sought relief from this court
by an application for writ of prohibition. Jurisdiction
was assumed by this court and in accordance with its
practice in such cases it disposed of the matter and settled the rights of the administrative board involved without remitting the parties to such rights as they might
have had in the district court.
The foregoing cases reflect a well established practice on the part of this court in cases involving the powers of administrative boards to exercise the original jurisdiction vested in it and give quick relief in the form
of determinations and adjudications of powers sought
to be exercised.

Terrace v. Thompson, 68 L. Ed. 255, 263 U. S. 197,
contains a scholarly exposition of the principles here under discussion. While the precise question whether the
Supreme Court should exercise its original jurisdiction,
was not involved nevertheless the decision is particularly applicable to certain aspects of the problem now facing us. The case arose in the State of Washington and
tested the validity of an alien ownership statute of that
state. A Washington landowner desired to lease his
land to an alien who was denied the right by statute to
own any interest in land. If a lease were made both partiPs thereto violated the statute. The state threatened
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prosecution of both parties if the agreement were entered upon. The landowner sought relief in equity and
the Supreme Court held it was a proper case for the intervention of a court of equity. In speaking upon the
subject the court said, in part:
''The unconstitutionality of a state law is not,
of its.elf, ground for equitable relief in the courts
of the United States. That a suit in equity does not
lie where there is a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical, and efficient as
that which equity could afford. Boise Artesian
Hot and Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276,
281, 53 L, ed. 769, 798, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Walla
Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U.S. 1, 11, 12,
43 L. ed. 341, 346, 347, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. Equity
jurisdiction will be excercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes
the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential,
in order effectually to protect property rights and
the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and in such a case a person who, as an
officer of the state, is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws, and who threatens and is about to
commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to
enforce such a law against parties affected, may be
enjoined from such action by a Federal court of
equity. Citing cases.
''The Terraces' property rights in the land in-
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elude the right to use, lease, and dispose of it for
lawful purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60,
74, 62 L. ed. 149, 160, L. R. A. 1918C, 210, 38 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 16, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201), and the Con1
stitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391, 42 I. ed.
780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383), and also protects
Nekatsuka in his right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life (Truax v.
Raich, 239 U. S. 33,-37, 38, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 13:4i,
L. R. A. 1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas.
1917B, 283; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L.
ed. 1042, :29 A. L. R. 1446, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625). If,
as claimed, the state act is repugant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, then its enforcement will deprive the owners
of their right to lease their land to N akatsuka, and
deprive him of his right to pursue the occupation
of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a
continuing unlawful restriction upon and infringement of the rights of appellants, as to which they
have no remedy at law which is as practical, efficient, or adequate as the remedy in equity. And
assuming, as suggested by the atttorney general,
that, after the making of the lease, the validity of
the law might be determined in proceedings to declare a forfeiture of the property to the state, or in
criminal proceedings to punish the owners, it does
not follow that they may not appeal to equity for
relief. No action at law can be initiated against

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
them until after the consummation of the proposed
lease. The threatened enforcement of the law deters
them. In order to obtain a remedy at law, the owners, even if they would take the risk of fine, impri~onment, and loss of property, must continue to
suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or
lease their land to any such alien until one is found
who will join them in violating the terms of the enactment and take the risk of forfeiture. Similarly,
Nakatsuka must continue to be deprived of his
right to follow his occupation as farmer until a
landowner is found who is willing to make a forbidden transfer of land and take the risk of punishment. The owners have an interest in the freedom
of the alien, and he has an interest in their freedom,
to make the lease. The state act purports to operate directly upon the consummation of the proposed
transaction between them, and the threat and purpose of the attorney general to enforce the punishments and forfeiture prescribed prevents each from
dealing with the other. Traux v. Raich, 239 U. S.
33, 37, 39, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 134, L. R. A. 1916D,
545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. They
are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines,
and imprisonment and loss of property in order to
secure an adjudication of their rights. The complaint presents a case in which equitable relief may
be had, if the law complained of is shown to be in
contravention of the Federal Constitution."
And so here it would be m:;king- more thRn thP lf\w
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required to demand that plaintiff, instead of invoking
the power of this court, run the risk of criminal prosecution which would attend violation of the regulation complained of. However strong one may be in his conviction that a law or regulation is invalid he should not be
required to hazard the results of proseou tion as long as
a speedy and adequate remedy is available. And if
plaintiff had itself been willing to violate the regulation
and rely upon the invalidity of regulation as a defense
to prosecution it could not have possibly made such defense for all purchasers of beer in violation of the regulation who would have been guilty equally with plaintiff.
The foregoing makes it clear that this is a case in
which this court should exercise its original jurisdiction
in order that plaintiff may not be denied the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to which it is entitled. A
discussion and consideration of the case upon its merits
will conclusively confirm the case as one for the intervention of this court's original jurisdiction.
Assuming that the court will take jurisdiction, we
will present the case upon its merits.

PART 2. THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS
NOT CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY OR POWER TO
MAKE AND INFORCE THE REGULATION
COMPLAINED OF
On April 7, 1939, the defendant Liquor Control Commission made and published its purported regulation No.
~0, which is in words and figures as follows:
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''Governing Bottling of Beer and Regulation
Size of Containers and Packages Used in the Distribution of Beer in the State of Utah.
Section 1. (a) No brewer, wholesaler, manufacturer or dealer shall import, cause to be imported
or receive or resell any beer within the State of
Utah, except in the original container as prepared
for the market by the brewer at the place of manufacture.
(b) No brewer, dealer or wholesaler shall
adopt or use in the State of Utah any container for
beer differing in size from the following:
11 oz. of beer
whole barrels
half
"
12 " " "
22
quarter "
" "
24 " " "
eighth "
32 "
64 "

" "

" "

Utah Liquor Control Commission
By J. W. Funk, Chairman
By Herbert Taylor, Commissioner
By Henry C. Jorgensen, Commissioner''
Thereafter plaintiff, in an effort to get relief from
the Commission itself, requested a reconsideration and
repeal of the order. In response to such request the
matter was reconsidered, appearances were made and
oral and written arguments presented. On November
16, 1939, the Commission recorded its decision not to disturb the order but to continue the same in full force and
effect.
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Plaintiff attacks the order as being beyond and
in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. The case is
before the court upon plaintiff's complaint and defendant's general demurrer. All matter properly pleaded in
plaintiff's complaint is confessed by the general demurrer. Keyser v. Erickson, 61 Utah 179, 211 Pac. 698. Resort will be had to the complaint for the facts which we
contend are sufficient to require a ruling that the regulation complained of is void as being in excess of the
Commission's power and jurisdiction.
Plaintiff is a brewing corporation of the State of
Colorado and as such authorized and licensed to do business within the State of Utah as an importer and wholesaler of light beer. Plaintiff's beer is bottled in Colorado and sold in practically all of the states surrounding the State of Utah in 8 ounce bottles. Plaintiff has
expended large sums of money in equipping itself to
sell light beer in 8 ounce bottles and has developed
throughout the territory served by it a large consumer
demand for its beer in such containers.
Regulation No. 20, subparagraph (b), of which we
complain, was adopted for the purpose of preventing
plaintiff and others from selling light beers in 8 ounce
bottles and from developing and acquiring a trade and
business in such product. The regulation has been, is
now, and will be enforced against plaintiff and others
unlP;.:s the enforcement is prohibited by this court. The
enforcement of the regulation has done and will work an
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irreparable damage to the business of plaintiff for which
there can be no recovery and for which there is no remedy at law.
By the general demurrer it is admitted further that
the regulation complained of is "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" and "bears no real or substantial relation
to or does not promote or protect or tend to promote or
protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare."
Yet the defendant Commission will penalize violation
thereof by a suspension of license or by fine or imprisonment or otherwise as in the Liquor Control Act provided.
Specifically it is admitted that by enforcement of
the regulation ''the loss to plaintiff of its respective investments, future profits and good will will be substantial, incalculable and said loss will not be recoverable by
any action at law."
Admission of the facts pleaded forces the Commission to the position that however injurious to plaintiff
the order may be; however arbitrary it may be and however unrelated it may be to public health, morals and
safety, nevertheless, the Commission is clothed by the
statute with such broad power that its jurisdiction in
the matter is beyond successful challenge. This raises
an issue of law which can, of course, find solution only
by analysis of the Liquor Control Act.
It will be unnecessary to cite authority in support
of the general proposition that all legislative authority
resides in the legislature or that such power rannot be
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delegated to any administrative board. True, if the legislature clearly defines the legislative purpose and provides well defined standards for carrying out such purpose then the legisla1iure may safely and lawfully impose upon administrative boards certain powers which
may appear to be legislative. But the standards must
be clear beyond doubt so as to leave, in fact, only administrative functions to perform.
The power necessary to give validity to regulation
No. 20 resides exclusively in the legislature and there
is nothing in the statute which evidences any intention
to delegate that power to the Commission.
An inspection of the statute will disclose that while
for some purposes the legislature treats "liquor" and
"light beer" together as alcoholic beverages, yet for
nearly all purposes involving details of control they are
treated as being different.
To begin with, the definition of "liquor" expressly excludes ''light beer.'' No liquor can be purchased
or consumed within the state (railroad service excluded)
unless it be liquor both purchased and resold by the
liquor commission. Every detail of the acquisition,
Htoreing and sale of liquor is under control of the Commission and every cent of profit from the operation belongs to the state.
The legislature, it may be assumed for the purpose
of argument, might have fixed by statute the size and
typP of containers in which liquor might be dispensed.
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Because it had and has the power to prohibit the use of
liquor at all if might fix the sizes in such measure as to
effectively prevent the sale at all. But having conferred
upon the Commission a monoply in the sale of liquor and
having charged it with the responsibility of all details
connected with the business it expressly conferred upon
it the power of fixing by regulation the sizes of containers in which it would dispense liquor. We are not for
the moment concerned with the question whether the
legislature abdicated its legislative power in so doing.
It is enough for the present that the legislature conferred
no such power upon the Commission with respect of light
beer.
By section 6 (i) of the statute it is provided:
'' ( i) Determine the nature, form and capacity of all packages to be used for containing liquor
kept or sold under this act. ' '
The foregoing demonstrates that the legislature gave
the details here involved careful consideration and was
in command of language apt to express its intention. If
there had been any legislative purpose to confer the
power necessary to give validity to regulation No. 20,
subsection (b) the legislature was not without the power
to clearly express the intent and purpose. It would haYe
been simple to link the words '"and light leer" to the
word "liquor" in the section quoted above (f jt could
have substituted the words "alcoholie bevorages" for
the word "liquor."
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Or in the sections of the statute dealing with light
beer it could have employed language equivalent to that
employed with relation to liquor. But it did no such
thing. The legislature was apparently willing to bestow
upon the Commission the power to determine the sizes of
liquor containers, but as to beer containers the legislature conferred no such power. It determined to occupy
that field itself. By section 96 it provided:
''Section 96. Receipt, Sale and Possession of
Untaxed Beer Unlawful.

It shall be unlawful for any person to import,
receive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale,
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in any
manner use, either in the original package or otherwise, any beer unless the excise tax imposed by this
act shall have been paid and unless a stamp or label
showing such tax to have been paid shall be affixed
to the barrel, bottle, or other immediate container
of the beer; provided, that the commission may by
regulation provide the conditions under which
brewers licensed under this act may possess beer
before the tax shall be paid thereon and the conditions under which they may export beer from the
state without the payment of the tax. It shall be
unlawful for any person to keep, sell, or otherwise
dispose of any bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more than sixty-four fluid ounces, and shall
be sold only in the original containers.''
The foregoing being all that is said by the legisla-
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ture upon the subject the only permissible inference is
that beyond the restrictions there contained there are
to be no further restrictions. If it be admitted for the
moment that the legislature might have so encumbered
the sale of beer by restrictions upon containers as to
completely stifle such sale it by no means follows that
the Commission has any such power. The sale of light
beer is legalized expressly by the statute subject to certain regulation by the Commission. But the power to
regulate
as conferred by the statute is not the power to
.
destroy. The power contended for by counsel in view
of the admitted facts leads logically to the contention
that the power of the Commission to regulate trade in
beer is the power to prohibit entirely.
The legislature has said only that glass containers
shall not exceed 64 ounces of beer in capacity. If within
that maximum the Commission may arbitrarily control
the size of containers it logically follows that it can prohibit entirely the sale of beer in bottles.
''Where a line of business is to be supervised
or controlled in whole or in part by a state agency
(Fair Trades Commission of Utah) the legislatiYe
enactment should by clear and decisive words indicate the intent so to do, rather than to leave the
power to depend on a judicial construction of doubtful words.'' Paramor Theatre Co. v. Trad.e Commission et al. 81 P. (2d) 639.
By rule 20 the Commission outlaws all bottle ron-
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tainers except 11, 1:2, 22, :24, 32 and 64 ounces. Tomorrow
it may outlaw the very sizes favored to the exclusion of
all others by regulation 20; and by regulation provide
that light beer may be sold only in bottles of one-half
ounce capacity. If upon the facts here admitted complaint of Regulation 20 is unavailing then a regulation
limiting sales to bottles of one-half ounce capacity or
any other size arbitrarily hit upon by the Commission
would be invulnerable. That the Commission is clothed
with some authority to make rules and regulations is not
denied. Section 7 of the Act as amended provides:
''The commission may, from time to time, make
such resolutions, orders and regulations, not inconsistent with this act, as it may deem necessary for
carrying out the provisions thereof and for its efficient administration. The commission shall cause
such regulations to be filed in the office of the Secretary of State, and thereupon they shall have the
same force as if they formed a part of this act. The
commission may amend or repeal such regulations,
and such amendments or repeals shall be filed in
the same manner, and with like effect. The commission may from time to time cause such regulations to be printed for distribution in such manner
as it may deem proper.''
The words ''not inconsistent with this act'' become,
we think, very important in construing the authority
and jurisdiction of the commission to make or enforce
any regulation.
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This court said in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 85 P. {2)
831 wherein this question was involved:
'It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the controlling purpose is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention and purpose of the
legislature. This intent and purpose is to be deduced from the whole and every part of the statute
taken together. Roseberry v. Norsworthy 135 Miss.
845, 100 So. 514 * * In the exercise of the rule making power the commission must be guided by the
intent and purpose of the legislature as found by
a reading and interpretation of the whole act and
every part thereof.''
The purpose of the act as stated in Section 2 is as
follows:
''This act shall be deemed an exercise of the
police powers of the State for the protection of the
public health, peace and morals to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic beverages
and all provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the attainment of these purposes.
And its rule making powers as seen by a careful
reading of Section 7 are limited to the regulations, orders
and resolutions as it may deem necessary for carrying
out the provisions thereof and for its efficient administration. In other words, it may not enlarge upon the express purposes of the legislature but may only make such
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rules as to efficiently administer those expressed purposes.
Section 83 of the Act provides as follows:
"Beer may be manufactured, sold, delivered,
distributed, bottled, shipped or transported or removed for storage or consumption or sale within
this state, or possessed or consumed therein or imported into or exported therefrom in the manner
and under the conditions prescribed in this act, or
in the regulations, and not otherwise.''
The "condition prescribed by this act" must take
precedence over any regulation made by the commission.
It will be noted that beer is treated in the act under at
separate article or chapter, being Article No. 5 and is
expressly excluded from the definition of Liquor contained in Section 3 as follows:
"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any
alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, malt, or
other liquid or combinations of liquids, a part of
which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented and all
other drinks or drinkable liquids, containing more
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by
weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether liquid or not, which contain more
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by
weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except that the term "liquor" shall not include
"light beer."
''Alcoholic Beverage''

means

and

includes
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''Beer'' and ''liquor'' as they are defined herein.
Section 3, supra.
And in furtherance of that distinction between liquor and beer the legislature authorized the commission
in Section 6 as follows:
''Subject to the provisions of this act, the
commission shall:
(e) Control the possession, sale, transportation and delivery of alcoholic beverages in accordance with the provisions of this act and the regulations. * * *
(i) Determine the nature, form and capacity
of all packages to be used for containing liquor
kept or sold under this act.''
Sub-section (e) is the only provision in Section 6
referring to beer and Section 96 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to import
receive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale,
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in any
manner use, either in the original package or otherwise, any beer unless the excise tax imposed by this
act shall have been paid and unless a stamp or label
showing such tax to have been paid shall be affixed
to the barrel, bottle, or other immediate container
of the beer; proveded that the commission may by
regulation provide the conditions under which
brewers licensed under this act may possess beer
BEFORE THE TAX SHALL BE PA[D THEREON
AND TilE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY
MAY EXPOR-T BEER FROM THE STATE WITH-
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OUT THE PAYMENT OF THE TAX. It shall be
unlawful for any person to keep, sell or otherwise
dispose of any bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more than sixty-four fluid ounces, and shall
be sold only in the original containers.''
This Honorable Court said in Bird & J ex v. Funk,
supra:
''The declared general purposes of the Liquor
Control Act, under which the Liquor Commission
derives its authority are ''for the protection of the
public health, peace and morals; to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic beverages * * * ''
And this court further said:
"Where the legislature delegates to an administrative agency power to make rules and regulations, such delegation must be accompanied by a
declared policy outlining the field within which
such rules and regulations may be adopted.'' Citing
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947; Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241,
79 L. Ed. 446; State v. Goss, 7·9, Ut. 559, 11 P (2)
340. From this it must necessarily follow that all
rules and regulations adopted by an administrative
board or agency must be in furtherance of and follow out the declared policies of the legislative enactment. If the regulations or rules are in excess
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of the declared purposes of the statute they are in-·
valid." State v. Goss, supra, Utah Manufacturers
Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198 23 P. (2) 229.
That the Legislature originally gave the Commission broad powers is not denied. But that they did not
intend to give (even if that were possible which we submit was not) complete and arbitrary power on the part
of the Commission to regulate the sale of light beer or
to prohibit the same is evidenced by Section 29, Chapter
43, Laws of Utah 1935 which reads as follows:
''Every action, order or decision of the Commission as to any matter or thing in respect of which
any discretion is conferred on the Commission under this act shall be final and shall not be questioned, reviewed or restrained by injunction, prohibition or mandamus or other process or proceeding in any court or be removed by certiorari or
otherwise to any court EXCEPT IN THE CASES
IN WHICH FRAUD OR EXCESS OF JURISDIC
TION IS CLAIMED.''
But even from the powers and authority granted the
Commission by the 1935 Act there was withdrawn in
Chapter 49, Laws of Utah, 1937 the power to grant licenses to sell light beer at retail and on draught and giving that power to the cities and towns. Section 89, Chap·
ter 50, Laws of U',tah 1937. In Section 103 the act pro·
vides for tax stamps to be affixed for containers of capacity other than the capacities mentioned in the act and
provides:
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''And if stamps are not provided by law or in
the discretion of the Tax Commission of denominations accurately adapted for the payment of the
tax on the maximum capacity of the container then
the stamp adapted for the payment of the tax on
the container of the next higher capacity."
recognizing the right to sell beer in containers of any
capacity under 64 fluid oz. so long as the tax was paid.
Section 104 as amended in Chapter 50, Laws of Utah
1937 provides for labels, caps and stamps to be used on
containers without restriction as to capacity. We may all
disagree as to the advisability of the Legislature restricting the powers of the commission over the control
of light beer, but as Jus1tice Wolfe stated in his dissenting opinion in the case of Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 85 Pac.
(2) at page 837,
"If the legislature detracted from the salutary
purposes of the act it must stand responsible to
the people. The courts cannot by forced construction serve those purposes to the people against the
expressed will of the legislature.''
Having in mind that the legislature contented itself
upon the subject of size and capacity of bottles by prohibiting the use of bottles of more than 64 ounces a reading of Tite v. Tax Commission, supra, will make it clear
that the order now complained of is void. In the Tite
case this court reviewed a tax statute which provided
that for violation of certain provisions a person became
subject to a fine of not more than $299.00 or less than
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$10.00. The Tax Commisswn, being charged with the administration of the law, found a violation and assessed a
fine of $250.00. This court condemned the assessment of
the fine and in the course of its opinion said:
"In this case, the Legislature gave the tax commission not only power to hear and det:ermin~
whether a penalty should attach, but within the
limits of from $10 to $299 to fix the penalty. The
commission fixed it at $250. This involved not only
the function of determining whether a situation was
such as would work an imposition of the penalty
fixed or ascertainable by law and the function of
imposing such penalty, but the function and power
of determining the amount of the penalty. This
involves not the question of whether the Legislature gave the taxe commission a judicial rather
than an administrative power (unless we accept
the plaintiffs' contention that this power to determine the arrnount of the penalty is really fixing punishment for a crime), but the question of whether
the Legislature could delegate such power to determine the amount, in its discretion, to any tribunal
as a matter of penalty imposed not as punishment
for a crime but as a sanction to pay the tax. We
think it could not do so. Giving to the tax rommission the power to determine in its own judgment
the amount of the penalty was a legislative funetion
which could not be delegated. It iR not the power
to enforce or apply a law, but the power to mRke a
law for each particular case, to determine in itR
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judgment the amount of a penalty. We recognize
the power to make reasonable rules and regulations
and to make a failure to obey them involve a loss
of rights either given by law or by the regulations
themselves. But in this case there was no basis provided for the commission to ascertain the amount
of the penalty by a mathematical computation, but
the broad power to determine its amount within its
discretion, from $10 up to $299.''
Here the legislature has said it shall be unlawful to
employ bottle containers of more than 64 ounces. The
Commission has passed a law that a crime is committed
when an eight ounce bottle is used. If the assessment of
a fine by the Tax Commission at a sum between $10.00
and $299.00 was making a law then most certainly the
Liquor Commission was making a law when it declared
it to be a public offense to sell beer in 8 ounce bottles.
If the Commission may pass a law forbidding the
purchase or sale of light beer in 8 ounce bottles there is
nothing in the way of its declaring it unlawful for a dispenser of beer to draw less than eleven ounces of beer
into a glass to serve his customer. A step further in the
same direction leads to the inquiry whether if a customer
can purchase no less than eleven ounces of beer he shall
be required to consume all he buys. If a customer can}
buy as much or little beer as he desires from a tap why
must he be forced to buy more than he wants in a bottle.
SUMMARY
From what has been set down before it has been
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made clear that this court has jurisdiction to hear this
matter upon its merits and to determine and adjudge the
rights of th~ parties. Possessing the necessary jurisdiction the court will exercise the same whenever necessary
to provide that plain, speedy and adequate remedy which
is the right of all persons whose rights are invaded or
threatened with invasion.
The case involves the exercise by an administrative
board of challenged powers and this court, recognizing
the advantage to the public of an early settlement of
such disputes, has rarely declined jurisdiction in such
cases. It is in the public interest to have disputes testing
the powers of administrative bodies quickly and finally
settled.
Furthermore, it is admitted here that plaintiff is
possessed of substantial rights which are invaded by the
enforcement of the order complained of; and that there
can be no recourse for the damage suffered by such invasion if finally it shall be ruled that the regulation is
void. The order admittedly does not promote the health,
safety or morals of the public but it is claimed that the
Commission has the power to make and enforce the regulation throughout the State. The situation not only jnstifies but invites the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction.
Upon the merits of the case it will appear tbat the
pommission has invaded a field never opened to it h~·
the legislature. It has assumed, without n•lation to the
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declared purposes of the net, the power and authority to
legislate upon the size and capacity of light beer containers. If such power be confirmed in the Commission
it will be at liberty to conYert the power of regulation
into the power of prohibition. If the Commission can outlaw the sale of beer in an 8 ounce bottle it may outlaw
the sale of beer in any bottle at all and thereby suspend
and prohibit a trade and business expressly legalized by
the legislature. Certainly there is nothing in the statutes
from which any such power may be implied.
To the end that the plaintiff may enjoy that plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to which it is entitled it is
respectfully submitted that the court should -take jurisdiction of the controYersy and upon a review of the order
it should declare the same to be void and of no effect.
Respectfully submitted
IRA A. HUGGINS
PAUL H. RAY
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Petitioner
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